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Abstract 
This study investigates persistence (or hysteresis) in weapons using a panel of 163 countries 
for the period 2010 to 2015. The following are some main findings. (i) Compared to countries 
that are landlocked, persistence in heavy weapons is more apparent in nations that are open to 
the sea. (ii) Relative to the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), heavy weapons is more 
persistent in the East Asia and the Pacific countries. This tendency is consistent with 
“weapons imports”. (vi) Evidence of persistence is not very apparent in “weapons imports” 
with the exception of the fact that it is higher in low income countries, compared to their high 
income counterparts. Hence, there is less hysteresis in weapons exports when compared with 
heavy weapons when weapons exports.  (v) The determinants of persistence employed in the 
conditioning information set are contingent on fundamental characteristics and panels. Policy 
implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
The paper is motivated by three main strands in academic and policy-making circles, namely: 
(i) the growing cost of wars in the world; (ii) the policy relevance of understanding 
determinants of and persistence in weapons and (iii) gaps in the literature. These points are 
expanded in chronological order. 
 First, according to the Global Peace Index (GPI) published in 2015, approximately 
thirteen percent of the global wealth or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is spent on addressing 
issues that are related to wars and violent activities (Anderson, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2017). The GPI report substantiates that in the year 2014, the underlying expenditure 
was equivalent to the annual wealth or GDP of the following countries: Brazil, Canada, 
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK). In the light of this stylized fact, arms 
from the global trade in weapons are substantially contributing to starting, fuelling and 
stopping wars that are socking a significant amount of world GDP. This wealth would 
otherwise have been spent on other socio-economic amenities and/or attainment of global 
policy initiatives like the sustainable development goals1. It is also relevant to note that arms 
acquisition spending (which are reflected in the weapons trade) does not equal to the cost of 
wars because if a country acquires weapons, it does not necessarily engage in war. 
 Second, in the light of the above, it is important to understand on the one hand, what 
drives the acquisition of weapons and on the other hand, factors behind the sustainability of 
trade in weapons. Understanding these factors underlying persistence is crucial because, by 
                                                          
1
 From intuition, improvements in human well-being are lost due to war and violence related expenditure. In the 
light of recent human well-being literature, human development consists of at least three main components, 
namely: income, education and health (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a, 2019b). War and violence deteriorate 
health and education infrastructure as well as reduce opportunities for citizens to effectively go to school and get 
treatment at the best hospitals from the best medical doctors. By extension, the realization of all the 17 
sustainable development goals can be negatively affected by war and violence. These include: Goal 1 (i.e. “End 
poverty in all its forms everywhere”); Goal 2 (i.e. “End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, 
and promote sustainable agriculture”); Goal 3 (i.e. “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all 
ages”); Goal 4 (i.e. “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning 
opportunities for all”); Goal 5 (i.e. “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”); Goal 6 (i.e. 
“Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all”); Goal 7 (i.e. “Ensure access 
to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”); Goal 8 (i.e. “Promote sustained, inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”); Goal 9 (i.e. “Build 
resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation”); Goal 10 (i.e. 
“Reduce inequality within and among countries”); Goal 11 (i.e. “Make cities and human settlements inclusive, 
safe, resilient and sustainable”); Goal 12 (i.e. “Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns”); Goal 
13(i.e. “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts”); Goal 14 (i.e. “Conserve and sustainably 
use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development”); Goal 15 (i.e. “Protect, restore and 
promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt 
and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss”); Goal 16 (i.e. “Achieve peaceful and inclusive 
societies, rule of law, effective and capable institutions”) and Goal 17 (i.e. “Strengthen Means of Implementation 
and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development”).   
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preventing and/or mitigating them, more trade in weapons could be substituted for more trade 
in other activities that are more beneficial to humanity. Persistence in a phenomenon is a 
tendency whereby past observations in the phenomenon influence future observations of the 
phenomenon (Asongu, 2018). Moreover, within the framework of panel data analysis, 
persistence in weapons among countries is apparent when there are cross-country differences 
in determinants of weapons trade, such that countries with lower levels of weapons trade may 
be catching-up their counterparts with higher levels in weapons trade.  Elements adopted in 
the conditioning information set (or control variables) also capture characteristics of a 
nation’s domestic defence industry. The notion of persistence is contingent on cross-country 
differences in these domestic characteristics. It is also relevant to clarify that persistence 
influences path dependence and the outcome of a path-dependent process is contingent on the 
nature of persistence in the outcome variables. Accordingly, the nature of persistence can 
influence a path-dependent process to either converge to a unique equilibrium or one of many 
equilibria. 
 Third, the positioning of this study is even more relevant from a scholarly perspective 
because the contemporary and sparse literature on the subject has not engaged the problem 
statement. In order to make room for more policy outcomes, the analysis is tailored towards 
emphasising some fundamental features. Accordingly, the dataset is decomposed into 
fundamental characteristics based on legal origins, regional proximity, income levels, 
landlockedness and religious domination.  
 To put the above positioning in more perspective, the extant literature on the subject 
has primarily articulated three strands, notably: determinants of access to weapons; drivers of 
the weapons industry and nexuses between arms trade and other institutional and 
macroeconomic factors. In the first strand, studies have focused on inter alia: linkages 
between, sex, selection of weapons and ornaments (McCullough et al., 2016); defensive 
weapons and defence signals in plants (Maag et al., 2015); the relevance of technical 
corporations in making nuclear weapons (Brown & Kaplow, 2014); access to firearms by 
people with mental disorders (Pinals et al., 2015) and reducing access to weapons by persons 
with suicidal intensions (Barber & Miller, 2014).  
With regards to the second strand, studies have been concerned with, among others: 
the relevance of assault weapon bans and weapon laws on murder rates (Gius, 2014); 
assessment of whether nuclear weapons are worth having (Suni, 2015); the nexus between 
nuclear strategy, nonproliferation and nuclear deployment (Fuhrmann  &  Sechser, 2014); 
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questioning the effect of nuclear weapons on conflicts (Bell & Miller, 2015) and security 
guarantees and nuclear proliferation (Bleek & Lorber, 2015).  
In the third strand, linkages between arms trade and other institutional and 
macroeconomic factors are oriented towards, inter alia: dependence in arms transfer and 
conflict in foreign policy (Kinsella, 1998); the US rhetoric against arms trade in the 
enhancement of democracy and human rights in developing countries (Blanton, 2000); 
instruments of repression in the light of arms import and human rights in developing countries 
(Blanton, 1999); global arms trade and regional security complexes (Kinsella, 2001); analysis 
of the evolving structure of arms trade (Kinsella, 2003); connections between military 
balances, arms transfer and interstate relations (Sanjian, 2003); nexuses between US arms 
transfer, democracy and human rights (Blanton, 2005); comparative analysis on the effects of 
US versus Chinese arms transfers (De Soysa & Midford, 2012); insights into associations 
between international reputation, human rights and arms exports (Erickson, 2015); 
geostrategic aims of arms trade and strategic choices between buying versus making weapons 
(Blank & Levitzky, 2015; Bağcı & Kurç, 2016); chemical weapons use, domestic repressions 
and growing tendencies in nuclear weapons delivery systems (Brathwaite, 2016;  Wasson & 
Bluesteen, 2018). 
 The studies in the literature closest to this research are Asongu (2018) and Asongu and 
Acha-Anyi (2019). The former has investigated persistence in global incarcerations while the 
latter have examined the comparative economics on global murder rates. This research 
extends this strand of studies by focusing on global weapons.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical underpinnings are 
discussed in Section 2 while Section 3 presents the data and methodology while the empirical 
results and corresponding discussion are covered in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 with 
future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings 
 
The theoretical foundation supporting the assessment of determinants of and persistence of 
weapons is consistent with recent literature on financial progress (Stephan & Tsapin, 2008; 
Goddard et al., 2011) and persistence in homicide and incarcerations   (Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 
2019; Asongu, 2018). Moreover, the theoretical foundations are in line with mainstream 
literature on income level convergence which has been documented within the premise of 
neoclassical growth models (see  Barro, 1991; Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995;  Mankiw 
et al., 1992;  Baumol, 1986). The underlying theoretical framework has been recently 
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extended to other areas of development economics, notably: inclusive development (Mayer-
Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014) and progress in financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno 
et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013). As argued by Narayan et al. (2011), it is unlikely to establish 
persistence and convergence within a heterogeneous set of countries because idiosyncratic 
tendencies may be many and loom substantially. Hence, the dataset is categorized into 
homogenous fundamental characteristics that have been established in contemporary global 
comparative literature on persistence in phenomena that are closely associated with weapons 
(Asongu, 2018; Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2019). 
 It is relevant to note that, new economic growth theories were developed in the post-
Keynesian époque. In essence, theoretical papers gained prominence fundamentally because 
of the sharp progress of the neoclassical revolution which resulted in substantial changes in 
income level differences across countries. Within the theoretical framework, market 
equilibrium concepts were expanded to articulate the relevance of economic growth theories 
which forecasted absolute reductions in cross-country income level differences. In accordance 
with Mayer-Foulkes (2010), success in such convergence trends was partly the result of 
favorable “free market competition”. Two main strands are dominant in the literature. On the 
one hand, a strand of the literature has established the presence of divergence or absence of 
convergence. This contending strand justified the absence of convergence with arguments 
such as: differences in initial conditions or multiple endowments and the presence of multiple 
equilibria (Barro, 1991; Pritchett, 1997).  On the other hand, there is another stand in the 
theoretical literature which maintains that irrespective of initial endowments, cross-country 
changes in income levels can be apparent within the remit of long-run equilibria or countries’ 
common steady state (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  
 This study is not positioned on any of the highlighted contending strands. In essence, 
the paper leverage’s on the common denominator used by the two contending strands to either 
establish or reject the hypothesis of convergence. According to the corresponding criterion, 
for convergence to be apparent, the absolute value of the estimated lagged endogenous 
variable should be between the interval of zero and one. Convergence in the context of the 
study is a process whereby, countries with low levels in a given phenomenon or 
macroeconomic outcome are catching-up their counterparts with higher levels in the same 
phenomenon or macroeconomic outcome (Asongu, 2013;  Narayan et al., 2011). In other 
words, in the presence of convergence in weapons, countries with small stocks of weapons are 
catching-up their counterparts with large stocks of weapons. It follows that the hypothesis of 
convergence in weapons is apparent when cross-country differences in weapons are 
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decreasing across time and this decreasing tendency is apparent when the discussed 
convergence criterion is met, notably: the absolute value of the estimated lagged variable 
corresponding to weapons should be between the interval of zero and one. In what follows, 
we discuss why convergence should be expected across income levels, religious dominations, 
openness to the sea, regions, and legal origins. 
 As supported by recent literature, convergence is unlikely to occur in a heterogeneous 
set of countries which is the primary motivation for decomposing the data into homogenous 
settings prior to assessing evidence of convergence (Asongu, 2013; Narayan et al., 2011). 
Hence, the choice of underlying homogeneous characteristics (i.e. income levels, religious 
dominations, openness to the sea, regions, and legal origins) is motivated by contemporary 
comparative development literature on their relevance in explaining cross-country differences 
in economic development (Narayen et al., 2011; Beegle et al., 2016; Mlachila et al., 2017; 
Asongu, 2018). Hence, while the expectations that convergence can occur within the 
homogenous sets of characteristics is consistent with the attendant comparative development 
literature, whether such convergence can be apparent within the framework of weapons is a 
matter of empirical scrutiny. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study assesses a panel of 163 countries with data for the period 2010 to 2015 from a 
plethora of sources, namely: the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; a Qualitative assessment by 
the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates; the United Nations Committee on 
Contributions; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime 
Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS). The temporal and geographical 
scopes are contingent on data availability constraints at the time of the study (Asongu, 2018; 
Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2019). 
 Three main outcome variables are used in the study:  (i) nuclear and heavy weapons; 
(ii) weapons imports and (iii) weapons exports. Variables in the conditioning information set 
include: security officers & police; political instability; military expenditure; death from 
internal conflicts and United Nations Peace Keeping Force (UNPKF). These indicators have 
been documented to determine access to weapons and weapons proliferation (see Brown & 
Kaplow, 2014; McCullough et al., 2016; Maag et al., 2015; Barber & Miller, 2014; Brown & 
Kaplow, 2014).  
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Following the motivation of this study, the dataset is decomposed into fundamental 
characteristics based on: (i) regions (Latin America; North America; South Asia; Europe & 
Central Asia; East Asia & the Pacific; Middle East & North Africa (MENA); sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA)); (ii) openness to sea (Landlocked and  Coastal); (iii)  religious domination 
(Christian countries  with Catholic domination;  Christian countries with Protestant 
inclination;  Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism 
and Protestantism is dominant;  Islam-dominated countries and Buddhist-oriented countries); 
and (iv) legal origins (English Common law, French Civil law, German Civil law,  
Scandinavian Civil law and Socialists countries). It is also important to note that these 
fundamental characteristics have been employed in recent comparative development literature 
(D’Amico, 2010; Narayan et al., 2011; Beegle et al., 2016; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017;  
Mlachila et al., 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b; Asongu, 2018; Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 
2019). The information criteria with which the fundamental characteristics are selected are 
discussed in what follows. 
 The underpinning of legal origins are from La Porta et al. (2008, p.289) whereas 
income levels are classified in relation to the stratification of income groups by the World 
Bank2. Categorisation by religious-domination is from the World Fact Book (CIA, 2011) of 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Countries that are landlocked vis-à-vis those that are 
open to the sea are directly apparent from a world map.   Details on the definitions of 
variables and corresponding sources as well as sampled countries can be found in Appendix 1. 
Appendix 2 provides the summary statistics. The correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 
3. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 We adopt the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as empirical strategy in this 
study. This estimation approach is consistent with the recent economic development literature 
on the persistence of macroeconomic outcomes (see Doyle, 2017; Asongu, 2018; Asongu & 
Acha-Anyi, 2019). The following four fundamental features motivate the choice of the 
estimation approach. (i) The N(163)>T(6) condition is met because the number of countries 
are higher than the number of periods in each country. (ii) The technique does not eliminate 
cross-country differences because it is based on a panel data structure. (iii) Endogeneity is 
taken into account because simultaneity is taken into consideration via the process of 
                                                          
2
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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instrumentation. Moreover, there is also some bit on the unobserved heterogeneity because 
there is control for time invariant omitted variables. (v) The system estimator corrects inherent 
small biases that are specific to the difference estimator. 
 In this study, we use the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) empirical strategy. This estimation 
approach which is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) is adopted because when 
compared with traditional empirical approaches (systems and difference GMM techniques), it 
decreases over-identification (or the proliferation of instruments) and accounts for cross-
sectional dependence (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiW ,
 
is an indicator of weapons (nuclear & heavy weapons; weapons imports and 
weapons exports) in country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant, 
 
X  is the vector of control 
variables (security officers & police; death from internal conflicts; military expenditure; 
political instability and the United Nations Peace Keeping Force),
 

 
represents the coefficient 
of auto-regression which is one for the specification, t
 
is the time-specific constant,
 
i
 
is the 
country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 We devote some space to substantiating the narrative on, simultaneity, identification 
and exclusion restrictions which is essential for a good GMM specification. With regard to the 
issue of simultaneity, regressors that are lagged are used as instruments for variables that are 
forward-differenced. In essence, for fixed effects to be purged from affecting the nexuses 
being assessed, Helmert transformations are used on the regressions in the light of attendant 
GMM-centric literature (Arellano &  Bover, 1995;  Love & Zicchino, 2006). The underlying 
transformation consists of forward mean-variations of indicators as opposed to subtracting the 
previous observations from the contemporary observations (Roodman, 2009; Asongu & De 
Moor, 2017). Such a transformation enables parallel conditions between lagged and forward-
differenced variables. Moreover, regardless of lag numbers, to reduce the loss of data, these 
transformations are engaged for all observations, except for the last in each country: “And 
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because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments” 
(Roodman, 2009b, p. 104) 
Concerning the exclusion restrictions, we treat all explanatory variables as 
predetermined or suspected endogenous and only time invariant omitted variables are 
acknowledged as strictly exogenous (Boateng et al., 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019). Note should be taken of the fact that the definition and selection of 
time invariant variables is in accordance with Roodman (2009b) who has argued that it is not 
feasible for time invariant indicators to become endogenous after first difference3.   
 With respect to exclusion restrictions, in accordance with the identification process, 
the time invariant variables affect weapons exclusively via the predetermined or suspected 
endogenous variables. Moreover, the suggested exclusion restriction hypothesis is valid if and 
only if the null hypothesis related to exclusion restriction is not rejected. This null hypothesis 
pertains to the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. In other 
words, the strictly exogenous variables or main instruments should elucidate weapons 
exclusively via the engaged suspected endogenous variables or selected mechanisms.  
 In the light of the above, in the result that are reported in Section 4, the hypothesis of 
exclusion restriction is valid if the DHT that is connected  to instrumental variables (IV) 
(year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. It is important to note that the engaged process for validating 
exclusion restrictions is similar to the standard IV procedure in which, failure to reject the null 
hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test implies that 
the strictly exogenous variables influence weapons exclusively through the suspected 
endogenous variable channels (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). 
 
4. Empirical results 
 The empirical results are presented in Tables 1-6. Tables 1-2, Tables 3-4, Tables 5-6, 
respectively show results for “nuclear and heavy weapons”, “weapons imports” and “weapons 
exports”. The first set of tables for each dependent variable category discloses findings 
corresponding to income levels, religious domination and landlockedness while second set of 
tables discloses findings pertaining to regions and legal origins. The last column of all tables 
shows results of the full sample.  Four main information criteria are used to examine the 
                                                          
3
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for 
predetermined variables. 
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validity of the GMM models4. Based on these criteria, most of the models are valid. It is 
important to also clarify that, while the validity of models is a necessary and sufficient 
conditions for assessing significant determinants, it is not a sufficient condition for 
establishing persistence in a dependent variable. In the narrative that follows, we discuss the 
criteria for establishing persistence. 
 Consistent with recent literature, in order to establish the presence of convergence, the 
lagged outcome variable should meet two conditions; namely: be statistically significant and 
fall within the interval of zero and one. For lack of space, we invite the interested reader to 
have more insights into the underlying criteria in recent catch-up literature (see Fung, 2009, p. 
58; Asongu, 2018; Asongu & Acha-anyi, 2019). Note should be taken of the fact that, in 
standard GMM reporting, the estimated coefficient corresponding to the outcome variable can 
be reported. Subsequently, one is subtracted from the coefficient to obtain beta (β= a-1), and 
the information criterion for convergence is that beta should be less than zero.   Furthermore, 
the estimated lagged value of the outcome variable can still be directly reported. Within the 
perspective of this alternative  framework, the convergence criterion is that, the absolute value 
of the estimated lagged variable falls within the interval of zero and one (see Prochniak & 
Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; Asongu, 2013, p. 192; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d, p. 459). 
 Given the above clarifications, the following is adopted as information criterion for 
establishing persistence when two sub-samples are compared: the sub-sample reflecting a 
higher estimated lagged value in the outcome variable is acknowledged to reflect more 
persistence. This is essentially because the relevance of the magnitude of the estimated lagged 
outcome variable.  In essence, within such a comparative scope, such a magnitude is 
important in the perspective that, it translates how past values of weapons influence future 
values of weapons.  
“Insert Tables 1-6 here” 
 The following findings can be established from Tables 1-4. (i) Comparative 
persistence cannot be established in relation to income levels, legal origins and some regions 
because the information criteria for convergence are not met, notably: the absolute values of 
                                                          
4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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estimated lagged outcome variables are not within the interval of zero and one. (ii) With 
respect to Christian-orientation, two of the sub-samples do not reflect estimated lagged 
outcome variables that meet the information criteria for persistence. Of the three other 
variables that meet the underlying criteria, the following order of increasing persistence in 
“nuclear and heavy weapons” is apparent: Buddhist-oriented countries; Christian-oriented 
countries with a Christian religion that is other than Christianity and Protestantism and; 
Catholic-dominated Christian countries. (iii) Compared to countries that are landlocked, 
persistence in heavy weapons is more apparent in nations that are open to the sea. (iv) The full 
sample does not reflect evidence of persistence. This partly justifies the imperative of 
decomposing the dataset into sub-panels. Accordingly, the absence of convergence in the full 
sample should not be construed as the absence of catch-up within some fundamental features 
in the full sample. (v) Compared to the MENA countries, the underlying weapons are more 
persistent in the East Asia and the Pacific countries. This tendency is consistent with 
“weapons imports”. (vi) Evidence of persistence is not very apparent in “weapons imports” 
(i.e. Tables 3-4) with the exception of the fact that it is apparent in low income countries, 
compared to their high income counterparts.  
 The findings of Tables 5-6 are somewhat different from those in Table 1-4 because the 
persistence in “weapons exports” is consistently marginally low. It follows that the hysteresis 
hypothesis is more relevant for “nuclear and heavy weapons” and “weapons imports”, 
compared to “weapons exports”. From Table 1 to Table 6, the determinants of persistence 
employed in the conditioning information vary in terms of sign and significance across 
fundamental characteristics and panels.  
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
This study has investigated persistence global of weapons using a panel of 163 countries for 
the period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments 
and three outcome variables (heavy weapons; weapons imports and weapons exports). (i) The 
following order of increasing persistence in “heavy weapons” is apparent: Buddhist-oriented 
countries; Christian-oriented countries with a Christian religion that is other than Christianity 
and Protestantism and; Catholic-dominated Christian countries. (ii) Compared to countries 
that are landlocked, persistence in heavy weapons is more apparent in nations that are open to 
the sea. (iii) Compared to the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), the underlying weapons 
are more persistent in the East Asia and the Pacific countries. This tendency is consistent with 
“weapons imports”. (vi) Evidence of persistence is not very apparent in “weapons imports” 
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with the exception of the fact that it is higher in low income countries, compared to their high 
income counterparts. (v) The determinants of persistence employed in the conditioning 
information set are contingent on fundamental characteristics and panels. In what follows we 
clarify some established linkages and discuss implications for policy. 
 The fact that persistence in “weapons imports” is more apparent in low income 
countries compared their higher income counterparts is logical because, weapons are largely 
produced by more advanced (or developed) countries. The absence of convergence in some 
sub-samples may be traceable to the fact that these sub-samples may not substantially reflect 
cross-country differences in variables (employed in the conditioning information set), needed 
to affect the outcome variables. This is a fundamental caveat in conditional convergence 
modeling. Accordingly, the evidence of persistence is contingent on variables we choose and 
model. Hence in some instances, these variables may behave differently in some sub-samples 
compared to other sub-samples.  
 We have also established that compared to “heavy and nuclear weapons” and 
“weapons imports”, there is comparatively less persistence in “weapon exports”. This implies 
that policies designed to influence trade in weapons should focus less on the “weapons 
exports”. This is essentially because of the corresponding less apparent hysteresis: past values 
of weapon exports influencing future values of weapon exports. Ceteris paribus, trade can be 
more influenced by trade dynamics that are more persistent over time compared to trade 
dynamics that are less persistent over time because historic data is comparatively more likely 
to be used to effectively predict trade dynamics that are more persistent. It is important to note 
that, there is an underpinning of stochasticity and processes that are more stochastic are more 
likely to be correctly influenced and predicted based on historic observations or data, 
compared to processes that are less stochastic. The inference and by extension, a 
recommendation pertaining to weapons exports, does not imply that policy makers should not 
be concerned with arms imports. 
 We have also observed that the determinants of persistence employed in the 
conditioning information vary in terms of sign and significance across fundamental 
characteristics and panels. This implies that blanket policies on drivers in the trade of 
weapons are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of the outcome 
variables (nuclear and heavy weapons; weapons imports and weapons exports) and tailored 
differently across countries with high, intermediate and low initial levels in the outcomes 
variables.  
14 
 
 Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing if the established findings 
withstand empirical scrutiny within country-specific settings. Such idiosyncratic lines of 
inquiries are essential for more targeted policy implications. Accordingly, for the sampled 
periodicity, China and Russia are having rising military ambitions and armaments. Moreover, 
the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is also relevant in this periodicity and by 
extension, other factors which may help determine weapons inventories/access that are taken 
on board include, for example whether a country is in an alliance, is part of an enduring 
interstate rivalry, or is industrially advanced. However, all these factors which should be 
considered in future research could not be taken on board because of data availability 
constraints and specificities of the adopted empirical strategy. Accordingly, while time 
specific effects are considered in the analysis, country-specific effects are not taken on board 
in the panel data analysis because the adopted GMM approach is theoretically and practically 
designed to control for endogeneity pertaining to the correlation between the lagged outcome 
variable and country-specific effects, by eliminating country-specific effects.  
 Another caveat that should be considered in future studies pertains to the fact that 
nuclear weapons and heavy weapons fall under the same category. Accordingly, the 
incentives for having nuclear weapons, the conditions for accessing them, the possibilities for 
having them, security policy reverberations, inter alia, are very much different to acquiring 
conventional arms and arms systems. Hence, it would be reasonable to separate ‘nuclear 
weapons’ and ‘heavy weapons’. Moreover, there is officially no market for nuclear weapons. 
However, it is also relevant to clarify that it is the categorisation used by the official data 
sources from which the dataset was obtained. These sources are provided in Appendix 1. 
Hence, we did not add “Nuclear weapons” and “Heavy weapons” to form the variable 
“Nuclear and Heavy weapons”. We simply adopted the official categorisation in the light of 
our data sources.  
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Table 1: Persistence in Nuclear and Heavy Weapons with income levels, religious domination 
and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Nuclear and Heavy Weapons    
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  -0.188*** 0.183*** -0.021** -0.004 0.007 0.002 -0.169 0.041 0.008 0.207**
* 
0.092 0.030 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.016) (0.170) (0.765) (0.759) (0.710) (0.427) (0.961) (0.000) (0.293) (0.472) 
Nuclear weapons  (-1) 1.000*** 1.048*** 1.007*** 1.001*** 0.985*** 1.003*** 0.978*** 1.064*** 0.967*** 0.794**
* 
0.982**
* 
1.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
-0.005 -0.007 0.004* 0.0008 0.002 -0.0001 0.044 0.009 -0.010 0.014**
* 
-0.002 0.004 
 (0.229) (0.679) (0.082) (0.183) (0.644) (0.867) (0.625) (0.892) (0.822) (0.000) (0.841) (0.515) 
Death from  internal 
conflicts  
0.184** -0.007 -
0.015*** 
0.001** 0.0009 0.002*** 0.005 -
0.012*** 
-0.027 0.006**
* 
0.0008 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.368) (0.000) (0.011) (0.394) (0.000) (0.907) (0.005) (0.209) (0.000) (0.912) (0.346) 
Military Expenditure   -0.001 -
0.127*** 
0.007** -0.001 -0.007 -0.004** 0.077 -
0.058*** 
0.051 0.001 -
0.037** 
-0.026** 
 (0.738) (0.000) (0.018) (0.163) (0.116) (0.049) (0.406) (0.000) (0.294) (0.289) (0.032) (0.015) 
Political Instability  0.011*** 0.0004 -0.001 -0.0003 0.006* 0.0001 -0.039 0.010 -0.008 -
0.012**
* 
-0.003 -0.007 
 (0.001) (0.975) (0.706) (0.670) (0.097) (0.724) (0.570) (0.281) (0.910) (0.001) (0.760) (0.366) 
UNPKF  0.004 -0.009 0.004* 0.001*** -0.0001 -0.0008 0.003 -0.006 0.006 -0.0001 0.004 0.003 
 (0.189) (0.348) (0.068) (0.008) (0.902) (0.120) (0.906) (0.361) (0.565) (0.928) (0.364) (0.159) 
             
AR(1) (0.111) (0.220) (0.065) (0.059) (0.189) (0.251) (0.246) (0.170) (0.127) (0.009) (0.058) (0.089) 
AR(2) (0.375) (0.211) (0.621) (0.388) (0.358) (0.404) (0.356) (0.319) (0.825) (0.244) (0.218) (0.203) 
Sargan OIR (0.871) (0.000) (0.045) (0.365) (1.000) (0.960) (0.137) (0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.658) (0.705) (0.481) (0.391) (0.810) (0.739) (0.997) (0.700) (0.999) (0.598) (0.889) (0.369) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.844) (0.785) (0.415) (0.688) (0.863) (0.772) (0.963) (0.345) (0.999) (0.696) (0.634) (0.471) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.430) (0.521) (0.478) (0.242) (0.614) (0.571) (0.980) (0.799) (0.978) (0.445) (0.865) (0.314) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.777) (0.789) (0.644) (0.399) (0.883) (0.600) (0.991) (0.590) (0.993) (0.386) (0.917) (0.655) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.278) (0.331) (0.205) (0.364) (0.355) (0.756) (0.893) (0.675) (0.965) (0.871) (0.468) (0.103) 
Fisher 55289*** 8718*** 7260*** 48267**
* 
22857**
* 
1.20e+0
6*** 
1251*** 1345*** 1078*** 1475*** 81.34**
* 
394.19**
* 
Instruments 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 159 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245 65 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: 
High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Lower Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian countries with 
Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Bhuddism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries. 
UNPKF: United Nations Peace Keeping Force.  
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Table 2: Persistence in Nuclear and Heavy Weapons  with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent Variable: Nuclear and Heavy Weapons    
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  na -0.089* 0.148 0.593** -0.009 -0.017 na 0.040 -0.006 -0.011 na na 0.030 
  (0.052) (0.134) (0.013) (0.120) (0.316)  (0.485) (0.649) (0.881)   (0.472) 
Nuclear weapons  
(-1) 
 1.011*** 0.971*** 0.892*** 1.004*** 1.007***  1.018*** 1.002*** 0.991***   1.011*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Security Officers 
& Police 
 -0.004 -0.022 -0.022 0.001 0.012***  0.018* 0.003 0.019   0.004 
  (0.772) (0.308) (0.487) (0.231) (0.002)  (0.059) (0.431) (0.519)   (0.515) 
Death from  
internal conflicts  
 -0.013** -0.085* 0.038* 0.0004 -0.002  0.002 -0.006 -0.014   -0.004 
  (0.020) (0.085) (0.084) (0.201) (0.326)  (0.732) (0.130) (0.810)   (0.346) 
Military 
Expenditure   
 0.044** 0.028* -0.070* -0.001 -
0.023*** 
 -0.068*** -0.0008 0.040   -0.026** 
  (0.023) (0.073) (0.069) (0.168) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.835) (0.415)   (0.015) 
Political Instability   -0.006 -0.003 -0.011 0.0009 0.008***  0.002 -0.002 -0.036   -0.007 
  (0.443) (0.804) (0.679) (0.237) (0.001)  (0.677) (0.695) (0.258)   (0.366) 
UNPKF   0.007 0.014*** -0.040 -0.0004 0.0002  -0.0003 0.001 -0.011   0.003 
  (0.223) (0.005) (0.296) (0.393) (0.790)  (0.920) (0.422) (0.248)   (0.159) 
              
AR(1)  (0.042) (0.034) (0.161) (0.052) (0.038)  (0.285) (0.020) (0.198)   (0.089) 
AR(2)  (0.254) (0.874) (0.506) (0.802) (0.624)  (0.296) (0.448) (0.208)   (0.203) 
Sargan OIR  (0.618) (0.162) (0.001) (0.479) (0.299)  (0.000) (0.151) (0.779)   (0.000) 
Hansen OIR  (0.748) (1.000) (0.999) (0.591) (0.972)  (0.898) (0.266) (0.979)   (0.369) 
DHT for 
instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
             
H excluding group  (0.948) (0.109) (0.443) (0.774) (0.459)  (0.884) (0.109) (0.913)   (0.471) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.463) (1.000) (1.000) (0.396) (0.996)  (0.747) (0.524) (0.922)   (0.314) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H excluding 
group 
 (0.538) (0.529) (0.853) (0.654) (0.920)  (0.846) (0.672) (0.928)   (0.655) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.903) (1.000) (1.000) (0.338) (0.889)  (0.701) (0.046) (0.922)   (0.103) 
Fisher  3824*** 8000*** 1003*** 40608*** 51896***  344.29*** 4750*** 7005***   394.19*** 
Instruments  27 27 27 27 27  27 27 27   27 
Countries   48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations   240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. SA: 
South Asia. ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. 
NA: North America. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.  UNPKF: United Nations Peace Keeping Force. 
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Table 3: Persistence in Weapons Imports with income levels, religious domination and 
landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Weapons   Imports 
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  -0.457 -
0.533*** 
-0.057 0.017 0.077 0.033 -2.084* 0.031 -0.377 0.010 -0.004 -0.032 
 (0.515) (0.000) (0.372) (0.585) (0.461) (0.785) (0.066) (0.753) (0.550) (0.749) (0.955) (0.677) 
Weapon imports   (-1) 0.945*** 1.332*** 1.005*** 0.981*** 1.066*** 1.034*** 1.101*** 1.016*** 1.089*** 0.945**
* 
1.029**
* 
1.071*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
-0.025 -0.047 0.019** -0.016* -0.051 -0.001 0.432* 0.026 -0.127 -0.016 -0.015 -0.032 
 (0.687) (0.229) (0.049) (0.066) (0.137) (0.939) (0.056) (0.415) (0.510) (0.187) (0.667) (0.375) 
Death from  internal 
conflicts  
0.271 0.018 0.010 0.013*** -0.006 0.002 -0.472 -0.002 -0.043 0.003 0.023** 0.014 
 (0.671) (0.129) (0.174) (0.007) (0.440) (0.695) (0.101) (0.872) (0.365) (0.288) (0.012) (0.143) 
Military Expenditure   -0.091 0.089*** 0.023 0.057*** -0.0005 -0.019 0.738** 0.035 0.139 0.018**
* 
0.016 0.024 
 (0.169) (0.007) (0.168) (0.000) (0.984) (0.636) (0.049) (0.146) (0.477) (0.002) (0.677) (0.487) 
Political Instability  0.186*** -0.010 -0.020 -0.015** -0.010 0.004 -0.134 -0.047 0.072 0.017**
* 
-0.034 -0.029 
 (0.003) (0.630) (0.255) (0.026) (0.765) (0.531) (0.567) (0.154) (0.661) (0.000) (0.242) (0.225) 
UNPKF  0.181*** 0.044** 0.004 -0.007* -0.0002 -0.002 0.120* 0.013 0.034 0.0003 0.014 0.012 
 (0.000) (0.023) (0.534) (0.054) (0.981) (0.803) (0.069) (0.526) (0.489) (0.937) (0.298) (0.330) 
             
AR(1) (0.024) (0.048) (0.015) (0.284) (0.080) (0.150) (0.247) (0.283) (0.938) (0.068) (0.011) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.712) (0.448) (0.238) (0.962) (0.560) (0.339) (0.906) (0.926) (0.452) (0.216) (0.568) (0.573) 
Sargan OIR (0.257) (0.032) (0.099) (0.215) (0.049) (0.999) (0.016) (0.174) (0.352) (0.712) (0.071) (0.171) 
Hansen OIR (0.826) (0.180) (0.582) (0.863) (0.370) (0.842) (1.000) (0.723) (1.000) (0.377) (0.268) (0.473) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.285) (0.234) (0.739) (0.605) (0.076) (0.301) (0.515) (0.337) (0.942) (0.055) (0.409) (0.608) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.959) (0.226) (0.405) (0.842) (0.778) (0.957) (1.000) (0.830) (1.000) (0.850) (0.236) (0.355) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.883) (0.183) (0.406) (0.771) (0.338) (0.930) (0.999) (0.550) (1.000) (0.792) (0.240) (0.286) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.411) (0.312) (0.788) (0.755) (0.433) (0.315) (1.000) (0.818) (1.000) (0.056) (0.409) (0.831) 
Fisher 524.85*** 371.25**
* 
360.33**
* 
1811*** 3102*** 7645*** 121.70**
* 
275.66**
* 
145.15**
* 
1121*** 113.34*
** 
81.13*** 
Instruments 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 279 130 70 245 65 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: 
High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Lower Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian countries with 
Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Bhuddism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries. 
UNPKF: United Nations Peace Keeping Force. 
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Table 4: Persistence in Nuclear and Heavy Weapons  with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent variable: Weapon imports   
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  na -
0.527*** 
0.754 0.275 -0.002 -0.295 na 0.059 -0.083 -0.579** na na -0.032 
  (0.008) (0.180) (0.472) (0.938) (0.155)  (0.350) (0.484) (0.038)   (0.677) 
Weapons imports   
(-1) 
 1.024*** 0.940*** 0.859*** 1.014*** 1.096***  1.017*** 1.014*** 0.912***   1.071*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Security Officers 
& Police 
 0.061 -0.112 0.135 -0.007 -0.053*  -0.011 0.052 -0.010   -0.032 
  (0.186) (0.364) (0.108) (0.500) (0.059)  (0.650) (0.142) (0.865)   (0.375) 
Death from  
internal conflicts  
 -0.008 -0.120 -0.007 0.002 0.021**  -0.006 0.002 0.604**   0.014 
  (0.738) (0.474) (0.822) (0.579) (0.034)  (0.555) (0.838) (0.019)   (0.143) 
Military 
Expenditure   
 0.157** 0.129 -0.001 0.009 0.010  0.002 -0.075** -0.066   0.024 
  (0.041) (0.302) (0.968) (0.393) (0.769)  (0.916) (0.024) (0.360)   (0.487) 
Political 
Instability ( 
 -0.025 -0.213 -0.212** -0.003 0.118**  -0.001 0.007 0.058   -0.029 
  (0.460) (0.147) (0.027) (0.676) (0.032)  (0.924) (0.821) (0.433)   (0.225) 
UNPKF   0.052* 0.044 0.101* 0.0002 0.011  -0.010 0.024 0.038*   0.012 
  (0.090) (0.247) (0.056) (0.963) (0.228)  (0.283) (0.126) (0.074)   (0.330) 
              
AR(1)  (0.047) (0.648) (0.237) (0.153) (0.047)  (0.139) (0.092) (0.236)   (0.007) 
AR(2)  (0.335) (0.942) (0.647) (0.214) (0.709)  (0.297) (0.555) (0.879)   (0.573) 
Sargan OIR  (0.304) (0.220) (0.080) (0.763) (0.089)  (0.887) (0.002) (1.000)   (0.171) 
Hansen OIR  (0.711) (0.986) (0.945) (0.594) (0.424)  (0.457) (0.502) (0.938)   (0.473) 
DHT for 
instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
             
H excluding 
group 
 (0.346) (0.596) (0.372) (0.159) (0.230)  (0.296) (0.355) (0.970)   (0.608) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.810) (0.996) (0.994) (0.866) (0.571)  (0.544) (0.550) (0.762)   (0.355) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H 
excluding group 
 (0.625) (0.974) (0.603) (0.415) (0.211)  (0.793) (0.449) (0.509)   (0.286) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.630) (0.787) (1.000) (0.794) (0.932)  (0.090) (0.502) (1.000)   (0.831) 
Fisher  216.2*** 599.3*** 107.43*** 7667*** 2010***  797.38*** 151.78*** 421.03***   81.13*** 
Instruments  27 27 27 27 27  27 27 27   27 
Countries   48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations   240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. SA: 
South Asia. ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. 
NA: North America. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.  UNPKF: United Nations Peace Keeping Force. 
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Table 5: Persistence in Weapons Exports  with income levels, religious domination and 
landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Weapons   Exports 
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  -2.117** 0.923*** 0.927*** 0.991*** 0.450 0.323 0.933 0.918*** -0.335 0.639* 1.057**
* 
1.107*** 
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.274) (0.548) (0.832) (0.000) (0.952) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) 
Weapons exports  (-1) 0.432*** -
0.070*** 
-0.002 -
0.042*** 
0.030 0.146*** 0.035 -0.001 0.071 -
0.030**
* 
0.062 0.047 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.771) (0.000) (0.137) (0.000) (0.776) (0.913) (0.911) (0.000) (0.181) (0.174) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
-0.110 -0.047 0.046 0.018 0.093 0.325** 0.511 0.140*** 0.166 0.339**
* 
-0.055 -0.138 
 (0.389) (0.610) (0.228) (0.680) (0.314) (0.010) (0.596) (0.000) (0.686) (0.001) (0.623) (0.209) 
Death from  internal 
conflicts  
3.874*** 0.028 0.049 0.009 -0.028 -0.072 0.782 -0.015 0.292 0.007 0.032 0.096* 
 (0.000) (0.176) (0.197) (0.753) (0.584) (0.488) (0.208) (0.399) (0.655) (0.871) (0.508) (0.078) 
Military Expenditure   -0.355** 0.134 -0.061 0.032 0.194** 0.225 -0.885 -
0.127*** 
-0.199 0.064 -0.118 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.118) (0.320) (0.682) (0.012) (0.305) (0.386) (0.000) (0.540) (0.366) (0.301) (0.873) 
Political Instability  0.182 0.035 -0.002 -0.012 0.081 -0.067 0.034 -0.006 0.187 -
0.142** 
0.154 0.083 
 (0.203) (0.445) (0.973) (0.826) (0.499) (0.418) (0.892) (0.891) (0.861) (0.017) (0.128) (0.293) 
UNPKF  0.013 0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.016 -0.311 0.016 0.066 -0.015 -0.011 0.015 
 (0.915) (0.705) (0.703) (0.794) (0.921) (0.627) (0.364) (0.410) (0.746) (0.425) (0.792) (0.666) 
             
AR(1) (0.000) (0.059) (0.936) (0.148) (0.614) (0.020) (0.794) (0.563) (0.798) (0.125) (0.187) (0.164) 
AR(2) (0.228) (0.309) (0.155) (0.890) (0.234) (0.648) (0.377) (0.361) (0.747) (0.172) (0.211) (0.213) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.793) (0.256) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.084) (1.000) (0.496) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.361) (0.856) (0.875) (0.998) (0.343) (0.855) (1.000) (0.851) (1.000) (0.499) (0.210) (0.176) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
            
H excluding group (0.114) (0.677) (0.386) (0.749) (0.178) (0.282) (0.795) (0.405) (0.905) (0.361) (0.032) (0.005) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.667) (0.794) (0.950) (0.999) (0.526) (0.971) (1.000) (0.921) (1.000) (0.541) (0.714) (0.963) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) 
H excluding group 
(0.162) (0.656) (0.747) (0.988) (0.248) (0.675) (0.874) (0.781) (1.000) (0.678) (0.112) (0.085) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.951) (0.955) (0.852) (0.962) (0.593) (0.925) (1.000) (0.692) (0.997) (0.195) (0.714) (0.752) 
Fisher 140.58*** 147.2*** 5.32*** 29.69*** 4.71*** 29.43*** 39.83*** 8.61*** 3.21** 62.79**
* 
1.01 1.56 
Instruments 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245 65 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: 
High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Lower Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian countries with 
Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Bhuddism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries. 
UNPKF: United Nations Peace Keeping Force. 
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Table 6: Persistence in Weapons Exports with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent Variable: Weapons   Exports 
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  na -0.556 -0.286 1.992*** 0.633*** 0.874*  0.998*** 0.770*** 1.497 na na 1.107*** 
  (0.306) (0.609) (0.001) (0.000) (0.072)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.328)   (0.000) 
Weapons exports  (-
1) 
 0.321*** 0.082 0.038 -
0.027*** 
-0.035**  -0.020** 0.026 0.104*   0.047 
  (0.000) (0.280) (0.499) (0.000) (0.011)  (0.048) (0.243) (0.060)   (0.174) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
 0.407** 0.338* -0.093* 0.123** -0.073**  0.144** -0.068 0.407**   -0.138 
  (0.029) (0.057) (0.085) (0.021) (0.039)  (0.042) (0.374) (0.010)   (0.209) 
Death from  internal 
conflicts  
 0.179 0.065 0.022 0.013 0.024  0.085** 0.015 -0.739   0.096* 
  (0.161) (0.639) (0.278) (0.668) (0.362)  (0.040) (0.713) (0.522)   (0.078) 
Military Expenditure    0.607* 0.120 -0.101 -0.019 0.186  -0.086* -0.037 0.027   -0.012 
  (0.095) (0.570) (0.193) (0.545) (0.307)  (0.086) (0.600) (0.922)   (0.873) 
Political Instability   -0.101 0.019 -0.091 0.035 0.015  -0.091* 0.134 -0.204   0.083 
  (0.367) (0.906) (0.350) (0.291) (0.836)  (0.073) (0.228) (0.551)   (0.293) 
UNPKF   -0.245** 0.069 0.040 0.011 0.010  0.042 0.033 -0.213   0.015 
  (0.027) (0.256) (0.385) (0.393) (0.646)  (0.113) (0.309) (0.315)   (0.666) 
              
AR(1)  (0.001) (0.184) (0.733) (0.116) (0.186)  (0.341) (0.277) (0.100)   (0.164) 
AR(2)  (0.208) (0.623) (0.529) (0.846) (0.476)  (0.631) (0.257) (0.234)   (0.213) 
Sargan OIR  (0.000) (0.026) (0.092) (0.000) (0.461)  (0.021) (0.000) (0.092)   (0.000) 
Hansen OIR  (0.295) (0.996) (0.893) (0.914) (0.999)  (0.714) (0.816) (0.951)   (0.176) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
             
H excluding group  (0.043) (0.616) (0.232) (0.667) (0.782)  (0.618) (0.710) (0.485)   (0.005) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.794) (1.000) (0.995) (0.889) (0.999)  (0.632) (0.717) (0.983)   (0.963) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H excluding 
group 
 (0.193) (0.936) (0.832) (0.851) (0.782)  (0.719) (0.827) (0.913)   (0.085) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
 (0.636) (1.000) (0.719) (0.758) (1.000)  (0.640) (0.486) (0.758)   (0.752) 
Fisher  20.70*** 25.64*** 6.65*** 35.49*** 59.07***  4.94*** 1.48 4.03***   1.56 
Instruments  27 27 27 27 27  27 27 27   27 
Countries   48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations   240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. SA: 
South Asia. ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. 
NA: North America.  Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.  UNPKF: United Nations Peace Keeping Force. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
  
Panel A: Variables 
Variables  Definitions and sources of variables  
  
Nuclear and Heavy 
weapons 
Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities 
The Military Balance, IISS; SIPRI; UN Register of Conventional Arms; IEP 
  
Weapon imports  Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons 
as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers 
Database 
£  
Weapon exports Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 
100,000 people 
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
Deaths from internal 
conflict  
Number of deaths from organised conflict (internal)International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD) 
  
Military expenditure  Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
United Nations 
Peacekeeping Funding. 
Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions 
United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP 
  
Panel B: Presentation of countries 
“Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; 
Liberia; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; 
Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; 
New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua 
New Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe”. 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
Variables   Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Nuclear and Heavy weapons 1.498 0.974 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Weapon imports  1.489 0.868 1.000 5.000 978   
      
Weapon exports 1.342 0.932 1.000 5.000 978   
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Deaths from internal conflict  1.405 0.933 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Military expenditure  1.966 0.824 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
United Nations Peacekeeping 
Funding. 
2.291 1.164 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Standard dev: Standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 978) 
         
S  O & P DFIC Military  Pol. Insta. UNPKF W. Imports W. Exports N & H W.  
1.000 0.031 0.215 0.042 0.0003 0.140 -0.011 0.120  S O & P 
 1.000 0.231 0.325 0.093 -0.115 -0.073 0.193 DFIC 
  1.000 0.336 -0.013 0.236 0.025 0.262 Military  
   1.000 0.402 -0.238 -0.285 -0.102 Pol. Insta. 
    1.000 -0.180 -0.210 -0.235 UNPKF 
     1.000 0.125 0.098 W. Imports 
      1.000 0.370 W. Exports 
       1.000 N & H W.  
         
S O & P: Security Officers & Police. DFIC: Death from Internal Conflicts. Military: Military Expenditure. Pol. Insta: Political Instability. 
UNPKF: United Nations Peacekeeping Funding. W. Imports:  Weapons Imports. W. Exports: Weapons Exports. N& H W: Nuclear and 
Heavy Weapons.  
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